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Lethal Injection: A Horrendous 
Brutality 
Robin C. Konrad∗ 
In 2012, I had purchased a non-refundable plane ticket to fly 
from Arizona to Alabama, where I was planning to witness the 
execution of one of my prior clients on April 12.1 But on April 9, 
three days before his scheduled execution, he received a stay from 
the Alabama Supreme Court because of pending lethal-injection 
litigation.2 He is still alive today because of the pending lethal-
injection litigation. That is one of the reasons I love this type of 
litigation.  
But I also hate this type of litigation. I am first and foremost 
a capital habeas attorney. As a capital habeas attorney, my job is 
to challenge the constitutionality of my client’s convictions and his 
death sentence. In habeas proceedings, I often argue that my client 
was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
trial counsel or that a prosecutor’s misconduct deprived him of his 
right to a fair trial. I firmly believe there is ample evidence 
                                                                                                     
 ∗ J.D., Howard University School of Law; B.A., Boston University. Director 
of Research and Special Projects with the Death Penalty Information Center. 
From September 2007 until May 2016, I served as an Assistant Federal Public 
Defender with the Capital Habeas Unit at the Office of the Federal Public 
Defender for the District of Arizona. During that time, I represented many death-
sentenced prisoners in their lethal-injection challenges, including being counsel 
of record for the petitioners in Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. ___ (2015). I am grateful 
to all of my colleagues who have worked with me on lethal-injection cases and to 
all of the other attorneys who have litigated on behalf of so many prisoners to help 
to expose the truth: that lethal-injection executions are cruel and unusual. I am 
also grateful to the Washington and Lee Law Review for the superb editorial 
assistance. Any errors are mine and mine alone. 
 1. This speech was delivered as the keynote address of the 2016 Lara D. 
Gass Symposium on February 5, 2016. I was honored and humbled to be a 
participant among so many great lawyers and colleagues, and as a woman, I was 
particularly proud to speak at a symposium in memory of Lara D. Gass.  
 2. Order at 1, Ex Parte Carey Dale Grayson, Crim. App. No. CR-95-1511, 
(Ala. Apr. 9, 2012). 
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demonstrating that the death penalty is, in fact, unconstitutional 
and can never be carried out in constitutional manner.3 Despite 
this, we don’t always win in federal habeas proceedings.  
Therefore, once the federal courts have denied habeas relief, 
the state will generally move forward to carry out the now-deemed-
valid death sentence. So I then have to switch hats; I am no longer 
challenging my client’s death sentence. Instead, I must 
begrudgingly accept that the state is entitled to execute my client. 
However, although the state may be permitted to carry out his 
sentence, it must do so in compliance with not only the Eighth 
Amendment but also the First and Fourteenth Amendments. So at 
this stage of the process, I now seek to protect my client’s civil 
rights.  
My experience with lethal-injection litigation started in 
September 2007, when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Baze v. Rees,4 a case out of Kentucky that challenged the 
constitutionality of the three-drug lethal-injection formula that 
was used by all death-penalty states at that time.5 With one 
exception, that grant of certiorari had the result of postponing the 
executions of all prisoners on death row across the country until 
after the merits ruling was issued in April 2008.6 The exception 
was Michael Richard, a Texas prisoner who was executed on the 
same day certiorari was granted because a court clerk refused to 
keep the door open past 5:00 p.m., even though Richard’s lawyers 
had called the clerk asking if they could file a few minutes late due 
to computer issues.7  
The Supreme Court’s decision to review the Baze case resulted 
in a challenge to the lethal-injection procedures in Arizona, which 
                                                                                                     
 3. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755–62 (2015) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (outlining the problems with capital punishment in America).   
 4. 551 U.S. 1192, 1192 (2007) (granting petitioners a writ of certiorari). 
 5. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 46 (2008) (detailing petitioners’ claims).  
 6. See Lethal Injection: Stays Granted, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/lethal-injection-stays-granted (last visited Oct. 
17, 2016) (listing stays granted between the Supreme Court’s grant of Certiorari 
and its merit opinion) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 7. See Michael Brick, Texas Judge Goes to Trial Over Execution, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/us/18judge.html (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2016) (examining the execution of Michael Richard) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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in turn kept the state from executing several of our clients for three 
years.8  
Did this litigation ultimately save these clients’ lives? No, but 
a stay of execution meant that they could investigate and litigate 
challenges to their convictions and death sentences that may have 
been overlooked including pursuing a DNA issue in one of our 
clients’ cases. The fact that a client remains alive also allows them 
to benefit from any change in the law that may impact the issues 
presented in their case. For example, one of my clients had an 
execution date delayed two years because of the pending lethal-
injection challenge. During those two years, we were able to 
investigate and develop a never-presented mitigation case that 
resulted in the United States Supreme Court granting a stay of 
execution on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.9 While 
he was ultimately executed in August 2012, we were able to litigate 
constitutional claims for him, and he was able to celebrate his 
fiftieth birthday.  
To be sure, this litigation has resulted in more than temporary 
stays of execution. Lethal-injection litigation has also helped to 
bring transparency to the process, make states accountable for 
their actions, and provide clients with access to counsel and the 
courts.  
The Supreme Court decision in Baze was fractured, but the 
opinion that was adopted by all lower courts was the plurality 
opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, which said that if states 
                                                                                                     
 8. On the same date that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Baze, the 
Arizona Supreme Court scheduled the execution of Jeff Landrigan for October 25, 
2007. Warrant of Execution, State v. Landrigan, No. CR-90-0323-AP (Ariz. Sept. 
25, 2007). Because of Baze, Mr. Landrigan initiated lethal-injection litigation in 
state court, and the Arizona Supreme Court stayed his execution. Id. As a result 
of the lethal-injection litigation, Mr. Landrigan’s execution was not reset until 
October 26, 2010. Id. The State of Arizona also sought warrants in several other 
cases after Mr. Landrigan’s execution was stayed (Donald Beaty, Eric King, and 
Daniel Cook), but the Arizona Supreme Court denied the State’s request because 
each of those prisoners had pending lawsuits challenging Arizona’s lethal 
injection procedures. See Order, State v. Cook, No. CR-88-0301-AP (Ariz. Apr. 1, 
2009) (order denying State’s motion); Order, State v. King, No. CR-91-0084-AP 
(Ariz. May 6, 2009) (same); Order, State v. Beaty, No. CR-85-0211-AP/PC (Ariz. 
Feb. 4, 2010) (same). 
 9. See Cook v. Arizona, 563 U.S. 916 (2011) (granting application for stay 
of execution.) 
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had an execution protocol similar to that of Kentucky, including 
having safeguards in place to protect against a painful execution, 
then a prisoner would not be able to show an Eighth Amendment 
violation.10 So states, like Arizona, began to write their protocols 
similar to Kentucky’s.  
At that time, the state of Arizona did not provide its execution 
protocol and procedures to the public; however, Arizona revised its 
written protocol, putting in place safeguards similar to Kentucky’s 
because of the civil-rights challenges brought by the prisoners. 11 
Arizona then published it on the website, making it available to 
anyone.12 As the state continued to execute prisoners, the 
prisoners continued to challenge the state’s procedures, seeking to 
obtain further access to information regarding their executions. 
The more that the clients and—in turn—the public know, the less 
that the state can hide the way it plans to and actually carries out 
executions. While lethal-injection litigation challenges themselves 
could be considered losses in the sense that they might not 
ultimately prevent an execution, they are victories for the 
prisoners who are able to benefit from the changes that have 
occurred in direct response to the litigation. 
And there is a larger unintended victory that has been born 
out of this litigation: dissenting opinions and a heightened national 
awareness about the death penalty.13  
                                                                                                     
 10. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 62 (“Kentucky’s decision to adhere to its protocol 
despite these asserted risks, while adopting safeguards to protect against them, 
cannot be viewed as probative of the wanton infliction of pain under the Eighth 
Amendment.”). 
 11. See Dickens v. Brewer, 631 F.3d 1139, 1146 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that 
Arizona's written lethal-injection protocol “incorporates even more safeguards 
against maladministration than Kentucky’s protocol”). 
 12. Arizona continues to publish its protocol on its website today. See ARIZ. 
DEP’T OF CORR., EXECUTION PROCEDURES 2–18 (Oct. 23, 2015), 
https://corrections.az.gov/sites/default/files/policies/700/0710_-_effective_10-23-15.pdf 
(outlining the procedures for planning and carrying out the execution of a person 
convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death). 
 13. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2771 (2015) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (listing questions raised by civil rights litigation); Wood v. Ryan, 759 
F.3d 1076, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing 
en banc); Editorial, America and its Fellow Executioners, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/opinion/america-and-its-fellow-
executioners.html?smid=pl-share (last visited Sept. 9, 2016) (“Americans, are 
increasingly coming to recognize the death penalty for what it is: morally 
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In order to continue to function in this completely 
dysfunctional system, we must focus on the wins. So rather than 
focus on our losses in habeas proceedings that have resulted in 
Arizona executing fourteen clients between October 2010 and July 
2014, I want to share three particular successes we have had on 
behalf of our clients, even though these particular clients are no 
longer around. 
One of these wins involves Arizona allowing witnesses to view 
the insertion of the intravenous (IV) lines. There were eight 
executions where the insertion of the IV lines occurred in secret, 
and we only learned where the catheters were placed after an 
autopsy. Nearly all of the IV lines were placed in the femoral vein, 
a method that requires a surgical procedure. The Department of 
Corrections (DOC) was setting femoral lines, even though its 
written protocol required the placement of IV lines in the arms14—
like nearly every other state does.  
Before the execution of Robert Towery in 2012, he and his 
attorney worked out a code so that Mr. Towery could communicate 
what happened during the insertion of the IV lines.15 If Mr. Towery 
asked for a lawyer during this process, then he would say during 
his last statement that he should have called his lawyer. If Mr. 
Towery experienced problems or pain during the IV process, he 
would use the word “mistake” during his last statement. The code 
was necessary because the DOC had informed Mr. Towery that if 
he said anything critical of the Department, then the DOC would 
cut off his last statement. During the last seconds of Mr. Towery’s 
life, he told the witnesses that “he went right when he should have 
                                                                                                     
unacceptable, inhuman, barbaric, unjust and useless.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 14. See West v. Brewer, No. CV-11-1409-PHX-NVW, 2011 WL 6724628, at 
*14 (D. Ariz. Dec 21, 2011) (explaining that Arizona’s execution protocol required 
the execution personnel to “insert a primary IV catheter and a backup IV catheter 
in two separate locations in the prisoner’s peripheral veins utilizing appropriate 
medical procedures”); id. at *8 (noting that execution personnel “placed a femoral 
central line” in all of the prisoners who were executed in 2010 and 2011).  
 15. See Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing the 
testimony of Mr. Towery’s counsel); see also id. at 1082 (Berzon, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“Towery and his lawyer developed a code by which 
Towery indicated that he sought access to counsel during the setting of the IV 
lines and was denied.”). 
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went left” and that he “made mistake after mistake after 
mistake.”16 He said that “in the end, he should have called his 
attorney.”17  
It was through this code that we were able to learn that the 
State repeatedly tried but failed to set the IVs, and that Mr. 
Towery asked to speak with his attorney during this process but 
was denied. It took nearly an hour to establish an IV line.18 Mr. 
Towery’s attorney was never informed that his client asked to 
speak with him, even though his attorney specifically asked why 
the process was taking so long. An autopsy of Mr. Towery revealed 
at least nine punctures from attempts to set IV lines.19 
Based on these facts, the next prisoner who was scheduled for 
execution brought a civil-rights lawsuit arguing that he should not 
be denied his right to counsel during the execution.20 As a result, 
Arizona changed its protocol to allow witnesses, including 
attorneys, to view the part of the execution where the IV lines are 
inserted.21 This was a win in civil-rights litigation. 
A second win involved access to our clients. This might be my 
favorite win because we won before the violation occurred rather 
than after. Several weeks before two scheduled executions, the 
State arbitrarily decided that we could not have an in-person 
meeting with our clients on the morning of an execution even 
though we had been doing this for years.22 Arizona executions are 
                                                                                                     
 16. Declaration of Dale A. Baich at 3, Towery v. Brewer, No. 2:12-cv-00245 
(D. Ariz. Feb. 23, 2012), ECF No. 60-1. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Lopez, 680 F.3d at 1073 (stating that IV access occurred 
“approximately an hour after the process began”). 
 19. See Private Autopsy Examination of Robert Charles Towery at 6, Towery 
v. Brewer, No. 2:12-cv-00245 (D. Ariz. Feb. 23, 2012), ECF No. 54-1 (noting 
repeated needle punctures).  
 20. See Second Amended Complaint at 28, Towery v. Brewer, No. 2:12-cv-
00245 (D. Ariz. Feb. 23, 2012), ECF No. 58 (alleging that “Plaintiffs will have no 
means by which to meaningfully access the courts if they are denied privileged 
communication with attorneys in the twelve hours prior to an execution”).  
 21. See Letter to Samuel Lopez from Dir. Charles Ryan at 2, Towery v. U.S. 
Dist. Court, No. 12-71786 (9th Cir. June 7, 2012), ECF No. 2-2 (informing prisoner 
that witnesses could observe the insertion of IV lines via closed-circuit monitors).  
 22. See Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that 
Director would restrict attorney access on the morning of an execution to 
telephone contact only). 
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usually scheduled at 10:00 a.m., yet the DOC decided that we could 
not meet with our clients after 9:00 p.m. the evening before the 
execution.23 We challenged the DOC’s decision. The Ninth Circuit 
unanimously found that the state action was without justification 
and ordered that the attorneys be permitted to have an in-person 
visit with the clients up until an hour before their scheduled 
execution.24 
This last visit is important for two reasons. First, we will often 
have litigation pending during that visit and we will need to inform 
our client of the status. With one of my clients, when I went into 
the visit, the Supreme Court had not yet ruled on his application 
for a stay. By having access to my client, I was able to personally 
inform him once we received word that the stay was denied, rather 
than having him hear it from a corrections officer. Second, being 
able to meet with our clients in the last moments of their life 
provides them with a sense of humanity and dignity. They are able 
to leave this world knowing that someone was on their side and 
advocating for them. This was a win in civil-rights litigation. 
The third win is my least favorite, and it came at a very heavy 
price. I want to tell you about the circumstances surrounding the 
execution of Joseph Wood, whose execution has been described as 
the longest in U.S. history.25 Mr. Wood took nearly two hours to 
die. 
The State of Arizona planned to execute Mr. Wood using a two-
drug combination of midazolam and hydromorphone that had been 
used in only one execution a few months earlier: Ohio’s execution 
of Dennis McGuire. Mr. McGuire’s medical experts warned that 
this drug combination would result in a prisoner gasping or 
hyperventilating as he died.26 And that is exactly what happened 
                                                                                                     
 23. See id. (“The 2012 Protocol, as written, permits the Director to preclude 
any in-person non-contact visits with counsel beyond 9:00 p.m. the day before the 
execution.”).  
 24. See id. at 1078 (directing “the Director to permit counsel in-person non-
contact visitation until 9:00 a.m. on the morning of a scheduled execution”). 
 25. See Bill Whitaker, The Execution of Joseph Wood, SIXTY MINUTES (Nov. 
29, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/execution-of-joseph-wood-60-minutes/ 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2016) (mentioning that the execution took almost two hours 
to complete) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 26. See Josh Sweigart, Ohio Increases Drug Dosage for Executions, NEW 
REPUBLIC (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119068/exclusive-
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in Ohio; Mr. McGuire gasped for air and took twenty-six minutes 
to die.27 Despite Ohio’s failed experiment, Arizona planned to use 
the same drug combination months later in executing Mr. Wood. 
In the weeks leading up to Mr. Wood’s scheduled execution, we 
filed a lawsuit asserting that Mr. Wood, as a member of the public, 
had a First Amendment right to information about the drugs to be 
used in carrying out his death sentence, including why Arizona 
selected this formula.28 Mr. Wood briefly won a stay of execution 
from a Ninth Circuit panel, where the majority ordered that the 
State could not carry out the execution until the State provided 
information about the drugs and qualifications of the personnel 
involved in his execution.29 The State asked the full court to rehear 
this decision; the court denied rehearing, and then-Chief Judge 
Kozinski dissented from that denial. 
In his dissent, Judge Kozinski—historically a death-penalty 
supporter from the bench—attacked the use of lethal injection in 
executions. Without reservation, he stressed that “[s]ubverting 
medicines meant to heal the human body to the opposite purpose 
was an enterprise doomed to failure.”30 In his words:  
Using drugs meant for individuals with medical needs to carry 
out executions is a misguided effort to mask the brutality of 
executions by making them look serene and peaceful—like 
something any one of us might experience in our final 
                                                                                                     
emails-reveal-statesworries-about-problematic-execution (last visited Oct. 17, 
2016) (examining Ohio’s decision to use midazolam and hydromorphone) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 27. See Lawrence Hummer, I Witnessed Ohio’s Execution of Dennis McGuire. 
What I Saw Was Inhumane, GUARDIAN (Jan. 22, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/22/ohio-mcguire-execution-
untested-lethal-injection-inhumane (last visited Oct. 17, 2016) (“I’d been told that 
a ‘normal’ execution lasted five minutes—this experimental two-drug concoction 
had taken 26 minutes.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 28. Complaint, Wood v. Ryan at 16, 2:14-cv-01447-NVW (D. Ariz. filed June 
24, 2014), ECF No. 1. 
 29. See Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076, 1088 (9th Cir. 2014) (granting a 
preliminary injunction without deciding the merits of the case). The panel 
decision was reversed by the Supreme Court the day before Mr. Wood’s execution. 
See generally Ryan v. Wood, 135 S. Ct. 21 (2014) (granting State’s application to 
vacate judgment). 
 30. Wood, 759 F.3d at 1102 (Kozinski, C.J, dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc). 
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moments . . . But executions are, in fact, nothing like that. They 
are brutal, savage events, and nothing the state tries to do can 
mask that reality. Nor should it. If we as a society want to carry 
out executions, we should be willing to face the fact that the 
state is committing a horrendous brutality on our behalf.31  
The day after Judge Kozinski claimed that lethal injection 
executions are made to look “serene and peaceful,” Arizona 
executed Mr. Wood. And according to witnesses, the event was 
neither serene nor peaceful.32 Several minutes after the drugs 
were injected, Mr. Wood began to gasp for breath.33 And he gasped. 
And gasped. And gasped.  
A reporter who witnessed the execution said Mr. Wood “gulped 
like a fish on land.”34 The reporter also described the sound Mr. 
Wood made as “a snoring, sucking, similar to when a swimming-
pool filter starts taking in air, a louder noise than [the reporter 
could] imitate.”35 Nearly an hour after Mr. Wood’s execution had 
started, he had not stopped gasping. One of his attorneys 
witnessing the execution left the room and asked for immediate 
access to a telephone. It took nine minutes for her to be escorted 
back to an area where she had access to a telephone, nine minutes 
during which her client continued to gasp for breath on the gurney. 
I was on standby in the office, and she called me a little over 
an hour after the execution had started. As soon as I learned that 
Mr. Wood was still alive gasping for breath, I, along with everyone 
else at the office, scrambled to draft an emergency motion for stay 
of execution. We filed motions in the federal district court, the 
                                                                                                     
 31. Id. at 1102–03.  
 32. See Mark Berman, Arizona Execution Lasts Nearly Two Hours; Lawyer 
Says Joseph Wood Was ‘Gasping and Struggling to Breathe’, WASH. POST (July 23, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/07/23/arizona-
supreme-court-stays-planned-execution/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2016) (detailing 
witness accounts) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 33. See id. (Wood’s attorney watched “Wood ‘gasp and breathe heavily’ for 
more than an hour and 40 minutes”).  
 34. Michael Kiefer, Reporter Describes Arizona Execution: 2 Hours, 640 
Gasps, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (July 26, 2014), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/ 
arizona/politics/2014/07/24/arizona-execution- joseph-wood-eyewitness/13083637/ 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 35. Id.  
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Ninth Circuit, and the U.S. Supreme Court.36 The federal judge 
who had presided over the previous lethal-injection challenges was 
attending a funeral service at the courthouse for a fellow judge. 
But as soon as he was informed of the emergency motion, he left 
the service and held a telephonic hearing.37  
I was on the phone representing my client not knowing what 
had transpired in the past twenty minutes or so that it had taken 
to initiate the proceedings. The State’s attorney, on the other hand, 
had direct access to the Director of the Department of Corrections, 
who was present at the execution.38 The State’s attorney told the 
court that Mr. Wood was still breathing, but that he was effectively 
brain dead.39 The court asked how that determination could be 
made as there were no electroencephalogram (EEG) leads 
connected to Mr. Wood’s brain.40  
The State’s attorney also told the judge that a second dose of 
drugs was given to Mr. Wood; that representation was made an 
hour and half into Mr. Wood’s execution.41 We would later find out 
that an hour and a half into the execution, Mr. Wood had not just 
been given a second dose, or a third dose, or even a fourth dose of 
drugs. An hour and a half into the execution, Mr. Wood had been 
given thirteen doses of a two-drug formula that the State’s own 
written protocol indicated would be administered in one single 
dose.42 Yet the State had told the United States Supreme Court, 
when asking to lift the stay imposed by the Ninth Circuit, that 
“nearly every detail about [Mr. Wood’s] execution is provided to 
                                                                                                     
 36. Motion for Emergency Stay of Execution, Wood v. Ryan, No. 2:14-cv-
01447 (D. Ariz. July 23, 2014), ECF No. 26; see also Motion for Emergency Stay 
of Execution, Wood v. Ryan, No. 14-16310 (9th Cir. July 23, 2014), ECF No. 36; 
Motion for Emergency Stay of Execution, Wood v. Ryan, No. 14A99 (July 23, 
2014).  
 37. See generally Transcript of Telephonic Motion for Emergency Stay of 
Execution at 18, Wood v. Ryan, No. 2:14-cv-01447 (D. Ariz. July 23, 2014). 
 38. See id. at 5 (noting that the Assistant Attorney General had the “director 
on the line”).  
 39. Id. at 7. 
 40. Id. at 8. 
 41. Id. at 7. 
 42. See Second Amended Complaint at 32, Wood v. Ryan, No. 2:14-cv-01447 
(D. Ariz. Jan. 29, 2016), ECF No. 97 (alleging doses in excess of written 
procedure). 
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him and to the general public, including exactly what and how 
much lethal drugs will be used.”43 While the court was making its 
ruling, the State’s attorney told us that Mr. Wood died.44  
Arizona has not carried out another execution since Mr. 
Wood’s and has stipulated that it will not seek to do so until the 
ongoing civil rights case has been resolved. Out of this awful event, 
there was a small win. The State recently amended its protocol and 
will now allow counsel for the condemned prisoner to have 
immediate access to a mobile phone in exigent circumstances.45 
This was a win in civil-rights litigation. 
Finally, I want to discuss a case that we lost (five to four) at 
the Supreme Court last term. And even though we lost the case, 
we gained a win because of Justice Breyer’s dissent and the 
national attention that it has brought to the death penalty. This is 
the case formerly known as Warner v. Gross.46 The case arose out 
of a lawsuit brought by twenty prisoners on Oklahoma’s death row 
after the horrific execution of Clayton Lockett on April 29, 2014.47  
The circumstances surrounding Mr. Lockett’s execution were 
described by the paramedic who participated in the execution as “a 
cluster” and an “atmosphere of apprehension.”48 Oklahoma had 
decided to use a drug it had never used before—midazolam. The 
warden in charge of the execution said, “The executioners didn’t 
                                                                                                     
 43. Reply re: Application to Vacate Stay of Execution at 2, Ryan v. Wood, 135 
S. Ct. 21 (2014) (No. 14A82). 
 44. See Transcript of Telephonic Motion for Emergency Stay of Execution, 
supra note 37, at 16. 
 45. See ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 12 (“While the attorney witness is 
in the witness room, a member of the Witness Escort Team shall hold one mobile 
phone designated by the attorney, to be made available to the attorney in exigent 
circumstances.”). 
 46. 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). The case was renamed Glossip v. Gross when lead 
plaintiff Charles Warner was executed before the Court considered his case. See 
infra note 57 (noting that Warner was one of four prisoners sentenced to death 
when the case was initially filed). 
 47. See Complaint, Warner v. Gross, No. 5:14-cv-00665 (W.D. Okla. June 25, 
2014), ECF No. 1 (“Each of the Plaintiffs is under a sentence of death imposed by 
the judgment of an Oklahoma court before November 1, 2011.”). 
 48. OKLA. DEP’T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, PARAMEDIC/EMERGENCY MEDICAL 
TECHNICIAN INTERVIEW 22 (May 23, 2014), https://assets.documentcloud.org/ 
documents/2092545/paramedic-second-interview.pdf. 
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know anything about this drug. No one did.”49 The execution did 
not turn out as the state of Oklahoma planned.  
After Mr. Lockett had been given the drug midazolam, which 
the state was using for the purpose of keeping him unconscious 
throughout the process, and after the physician-executioner 
determined Mr. Lockett was, in fact, unconscious,50 he awoke. Mr. 
Lockett began jerking and writhing against the restraints,51 and 
witnesses heard him say “oh man,”52 “something is 
wrong,”53 and “this shit is fucking with my mind.”54 After this, the 
blinds were then closed so that witnesses could no longer watch 
the execution, but Mr. Lockett remained alive. The physician-
executioner, who had realized the IV line, at some point, had failed, 
attempted to set another IV line; he punctured Mr. Lockett’s artery 
instead, causing what the warden described as a “bloody mess.”55 
Forty-three minutes after it had begun, the execution was called 
off by the Governor.56 Mr. Lockett died ten minutes later.  
The civil rights lawsuit filed after Mr. Lockett’s execution was 
the case that ended up in the Supreme Court; the argument was 
held on the one-year anniversary of Mr. Lockett’s death. Most 
people know the case as Glossip v. Gross, but when we filed the 
petition for a writ of certiorari and the stay application, it was on 
behalf of four Oklahoma death row prisoners: Charles Warner, 
                                                                                                     
 49. OKLA. DEP’T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, WARDEN ANITA TRAMMELL INTERVIEW 56 
(June 2, 2014) [hereinafter WARDEN ANITA TRAMMELL INTERVIEW], 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/dps-interview-of-osp-warden-anita-trammell/pdf_7b 
6599c0-60dd-5df4-a1c5-9184dbc3c90e.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2016) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 50. Transcript of Recorded Interview of Director Robert Patton, Okla. Dep’t 
of Public Safety 32 (June 3, 2014), http://www.tulsaworld.com/dps-interview-of-
doc-director-robert-patton/pdf_2cfbb3 c1-da49-5b04-b34f-7b1d1ffcbef5.html (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 51. Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing at 19, 193, Warner v. 
Gross, No. 5:14-cv-00665-F, (W.D. Okla. Dec. 17–19, 2014). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.; Ruling at 14, Warner v. Gross, No. 5:14-cv-00665-F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 
22, 2014).  
 54. Ruling at 14, Warner v. Gross, No. 5:14-cv-00665-F (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 
2014). 
 55. WARDEN ANITA TRAMMELL INTERVIEW, supra note 49, at 51. 
 56. OKLA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, THE EXECUTION OF CLAYTON D. LOCKETT 18–
19 (2014). 
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Richard Glossip, John Grant, and Benjamin Cole.57 Charles 
Warner was the named petitioner because he was the one with the 
earliest execution date, scheduled for 6:00 p.m. on Thursday, 
January 15, 2015. The other execution dates followed behind in 
late January, mid-February, and early March.  
We lost in the district court on December 22, 2014;58 we lost in 
the Tenth Circuit on January 13, 2015;59 and we filed our papers 
with the Supreme Court the next day. On January 15, at 6:11 p.m., 
I received a call from the Supreme Court clerk letting me know 
that the stay application had been denied, but that there was a 
dissent by Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, 
and Kagan.60 And it was a powerful dissent. The eight-page dissent 
did not stop Oklahoma from killing Mr. Warner, but it did 
acknowledge that we had science on our side and the drug formula 
that Oklahoma was using was likely unconstitutional; they 
thought we should have gotten a stay.61  
Mr. Warner was pronounced dead approximately one hour 
later.62 I thought that was the end of the story; it was not. One 
                                                                                                     
 57. Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721 (10th Cir. 2015), cert granted sub. nom. 
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015). 
 58. See generally Warner v. Gross, No. CIV-14-0665-F, 2014 WL 7671680 
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014). 
 59. See Gross, 776 F.3d at 736 (“We ultimately conclude, having rejected 
plaintiffs’ various challenges to the district court’s analysis of Counts 2 and 7, 
that the district court correctly determined that plaintiffs failed to establish a 
significant possibility of success . . . .”).  
 60. See Warner v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 824, 827 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
from the denial of the application for stay of execution) (noting that she is “deeply 
troubled” by the evidence presented by petitioners and that she “struggle[s] to 
see” how the district court’s “decision to credit the testimony of a single purported 
expert can be supported given the substantial body of conflicting empirical and 
anecdotal evidence”). 
 61. See id. at 828 (“I believe that we should have granted petitioners’ 
application for stay. The questions before us are especially important now, given 
States’ increasing reliance on new and scientifically untested methods of 
execution.”) 
 62. See Andrew Buncombe, Charles Warner Execution: Oklahoma Inmate’s 
Last Words Are ‘My Body Is on Fire’ as State Carries Out First Death Penalty in 
Nine Months, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/ 
news/world/americas/charles-warner-execution-my-body-is-on-fire-9981842.html 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2016) (noting that Warner was pronounced dead at 7:28 p.m.) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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week later, on Friday afternoon, I was sitting in my office when I 
received another telephone call from the Supreme Court clerk. 
This time, he called to tell me that the Court—even though it had 
denied the application to stay the executions—had decided to grant 
review in this case.63  
The case before the Court on review was a narrow one: it was 
about Oklahoma’s use of a specific drug in executions, the 
petitioner’s burden of proof, and the district court’s commission of 
clear error.64  
I honestly believed that the Court was interested in the 
questions presented when I was standing at the podium arguing 
on behalf of my clients. It turns out, I was wrong. Little did I know 
that this oral argument would later be described by Slate 
journalist Dahlia Lithwick as a “horrifying day at Court” where the 
Justices reacted with “nasty tempers and bitter resentments.”65 It 
felt as though the lawyers had not even needed to be there; the 
Justices were doing just fine on their own arguing amongst 
themselves.  
What was going on during argument was bigger—much 
bigger—than a case merely addressing Oklahoma’s use of a 
particular drug in executions and challenging the district court’s 
errors. Fortunately, Justice Breyer had his own agenda. And his 
dissent has become perhaps the most important dissent in recent 
death penalty jurisprudence.66 It is a dissent that has nothing to 
do with the questions related to lethal injection that were 
presented to the Court for review.  
                                                                                                     
 63. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 1173, 1173 (2015) (granting writ of 
certiorari). 
 64. See Brief for Petitioner at (i), Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) 14-
7955 (stating questions presented). 
 65. Dahlia Lithwick, A Horrifying Day at Court: Death Brings Out the Worst 
in the Justices, SLATE (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_ 
and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2015/04/glossip_v_gross_supreme_court_
justices_argue_about_lethal_injection_abolition.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2016) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 66. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2755 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[R]ather than try 
to patch up the death penalty’s legal wounds one at a time, I would ask for full 
briefing on a more basic question: whether the death penalty violates the 
Constitution.”). 
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Rather, it is a dissent that was foreshadowed by a question 
that Justice Breyer asked during oral argument: “Perhaps there is 
that larger question, that . . . if there is no method of executing a 
person that does not cause unacceptable pain, that, in addition to 
other things, might show that the death penalty is not consistent 
with the Eighth Amendment.”67 While there was certainly truth to 
Justice Breyer’s hypothetical, that was not the question presented 
to the Court.  
Justice Breyer’s dissent, which was joined by Justice 
Ginsburg, is more than thirty pages long and explains all of the 
problems with how the death penalty is currently imposed.68 This 
dissent provides a road map of the serious unreliability, the 
arbitrariness in application, and the unconscionably long delays in 
the administration of the death penalty. As Justice Breyer 
explains, these factors, combined with the fact that most places 
within the United States have abandoned its use and based on his 
own experience on the Court, have led him to believe that the death 
penalty now likely constitutes a legally prohibited “cruel and 
unusual punishment.”69 
I know firsthand each of the problems that Justice Breyer 
describes. How can the death penalty be reliable in a case where it 
was imposed on my twenty-four-year-old brain-damaged client 
who killed no one? My client was parked at a rest stop with his 
very disturbed teenage friend, a friend who crossed the four-lane 
interstate and shot and killed two people execution style.70 My 
                                                                                                     
 67. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Glossip v. Gross, No. 14-7955, 135 S. 
Ct. 2726 (2015). 
 68. See Glossip 135 S. Ct. at 2755–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Today’s 
administration of the death penalty involves three fundamental constitutional 
defects: (1) serious unreliability, (2) arbitrariness in application, and 
(3) unconscionably long delays that undermine the death penalty’s penological 
purpose.”). Although Justice Sotomayor’s dissent demonstrates the problems with 
implementing lethal-injection protocols, her dissent does not have significance 
beyond the facts of the case and to litigants raising claims similar to those 
presented in Glossip. Id. at 2780–81. 
 69. Id. at 2756. 
 70. See, e.g., Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1339 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) 
(Christen, J., dissenting) (“Imposing the death penalty on Gregory Dickens, the 
getaway driver in an armed robbery ‘who neither took life, attempted to take life, 
nor intended to take life,’ violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and 
is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.”) (citation 
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client received the death penalty because his teenage friend, who 
was a known pathological liar, testified against him—lying on the 
stand and saying that my client had commanded him to kill the 
witnesses via walkie-talkies. On direct appeal and in the habeas 
appeal, the state admitted that this information was untrue.71  
This client received the death penalty at a time where Arizona 
used judges, not juries, to impose the sentence. Three jurors on 
their own accord wrote the judge after trial saying that they did 
not think my client should get death, and one juror wasn’t even 
sure my client was guilty.72 The judge—who had rejected his own 
son for being gay73—sentenced my openly gay client to death. How 
can that sentence be reliable?  
The reliability of a death sentence also depends on the 
effectiveness of defense counsel. In one case, my client’s lead trial 
counsel, who represented my client for over one year before going 
to trial, admitted that he spent approximately six to eight hours 
preparing for trial.74 My client’s trial lasted one day. The jury 
deliberated 12 minutes to determine his guilt.75 How can that 
conviction, let alone the death sentence, be reliable?  
The application of the death penalty is not only unreliable, but 
also entirely arbitrary and depends often on factors such as 
location. If a defendant is charged with killing someone in a certain 
county, then he will be more likely to face a death sentence. One of 
my clients has schizophrenia and was charged with shooting a 
                                                                                                     
omitted); see also id. at 1324 (Watford, J., concurring) (noting that he “would have 
held that the Eighth Amendment bars Dickens’ execution” if he were not required 
to owe deference to the state court decision if it the “interpretation is erroneous”).  
 71. Id. at 1344 (Christen, J., dissenting) (noting that the “the Arizona 
Assistant Attorney General conceded that neither the jury nor the trial court 
believed Amaral’s walkie-talkie story”); see also Trial Oral Argument at 52:38-
53:03 (June 24, 2013), Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1339 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(counsel disavowing the walkie-talkie story).  
 72. See Opening Brief at 22–23, Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302 (9th Cir. 
2014) (No. 08-99017) (quoting three juror’s letters). 
 73. See Excerpt of Record at 858–60, Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (No. 08-99017) (affidavit describing the outward hostility Judge Cole 
expressed toward gay people, including his own son).  
 74. See Petitioner’s Brief on Merits at 33, Flowers v. Thomas, No. 2:10-cv-
00579-MEF (M.D. Ala. 2012), ECF No. 35 (discussing counsel’s testimony). 
 75. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5, Flowers v. Allen, (No. 2:10-
cv-00579-MEF (M.D. Ala. 2012), ECF No. 1. 
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man, who ultimately died because of the incompetence of those 
providing medical care.76 The prosecutors did not think that this 
should be a death penalty case, but the County Attorney told them 
that they had to seek death because at least one aggravating 
circumstance existed—that the victim was killed for pecuniary 
gain.77 But states now have so many aggravating circumstances 
that any murder can fit into one of the categories. How is this not 
arbitrary?  
Finally, the death penalty, which can take decades before it is 
carried out, serves no legitimate penological purpose. As Justice 
Breyer explains, the “delay is in part a problem that the 
Constitution’s own demands create.”78 Because the Constitution 
requires procedural safeguards and heightened reliability to 
ensure fairness and accuracy when the ultimate punishment is 
imposed, capital case review takes a long time. The cruelty of delay 
is two-fold.  
First, “lengthy delay in and of itself is especially cruel because 
it ‘subjects death row inmates to decades of especially severe, 
dehumanizing conditions of confinement.’”79 In Arizona, death row 
prisoners are kept in a single cell with no access to natural light, 
but a fluorescent “security” light remains on at all times. The 
prisoners never have human contact—no family contact, no lawyer 
contact, no person to ever touch them in a kind manner. Three 
times per week, the prisoners are permitted to go outside and to 
take a shower. The outdoor facility is a rectangular area with high 
concrete walls covered at the top with mesh so that they can never 
look at the sky without seeing it covered by wire. Unless the 
prisoner has a legal or personal visit, he remains in his cell the rest 
of the time.80  
                                                                                                     
 76. Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 147–48, White v. Ryan, 
No. 3:08-cv-08139-GMS (D. Ariz. July 10, 2015), ECF No. 273. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 79. Id. at 2765 (citing Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1069 (2009) 
(Stevens, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari)). 
 80. See generally Comer v. Stewart, 230 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1034 (D. Ariz. 
2002); Cruel Isolation: Amnesty International’s Concerns About Conditions in 
Arizona Maximum Security Prisons, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 2, 2012) 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/cruel-isolation-amnesty-international-
s-concerns-about-conditions-in-arizona-maximum-security-prison (last visited 
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Second, “lengthy delay undermines the death penalty’s 
penological rationale”: deterrence and retribution.81 While there 
has been debate as to whether the death penalty will, in fact, deter 
a person from killing someone, my own experience has led me to 
believe that it does not serve as a deterrent. Many individuals who 
end up on death row are seriously mentally ill, come from 
dysfunctional and traumatic backgrounds, were highly intoxicated 
at the time of the crime, and never even contemplated the risks or 
the benefits of the act that resulted in their death sentence. 
Several of my clients were not even aware that the death penalty 
was a punishment in their state before they were convicted.  
The value of retribution—restoring the community with its 
loss—is decreased as the years go by. In some cases, the victim’s 
family members have passed away; the community is not the same 
community that sentenced the offender twenty-plus years ago. And 
most often, the offender is no longer the same person who 
committed the crime in the years prior. In prison, he is no longer 
able to abuse drugs or alcohol, he is often provided psychiatric 
medication, and he often develops meaningful relationships with 
other people. In essence, the goal of retribution really only serves 
the purpose of revenge. We as a society are better than that.  
So, while a dissent may not immediately save my client’s life—
and certainly Justice Sotomayor and her three joining members of 
the bench could not save Charles Warner’s life—it serves a bigger 
purpose. To quote one of my favorite Justices, Thurgood Marshall, 
who inspired me as I studied in the same law school that he did: 
“We must dissent from the indifference. We must dissent from the 
apathy . . . . We must dissent because America can do better, 
because America has no choice but to do better.”82 Dissenting 
opinions can be crucial in leading America to do better—to rid itself 
of an unjust system that can never be fairly or consistently applied.  
This is where capital defense attorneys come into play. I am 
constantly inspired by so many of my colleagues—the ones I know 
personally, the ones I know through listservs, and the ones I read 
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 81. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2765 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 82. Former Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall, The Liberty Medal 
Acceptance Speech (July 4, 1992), http://genius.com/Thurgood-marshall-the-
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and hear about. As long as executions continue, we will continue 
to work. It is a system stacked against our clients, but we continue 
to work. We work even when we think that it won’t matter, that 
we won’t win, that the judge won’t grant our client any relief. We 
still continue to file pleadings, argue cases, and attend executions. 
This is often our job, at times almost literally, twenty-four hours a 
day, seven days a week. We commit our hearts and our minds to 
individuals because occasionally we do win, even little victories. 
We do this, because we believe America can do better. We believe 
that the time has come for the state to stop “committing a 
horrendous brutality on our behalf.” 83 
                                                                                                     
 83. Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014) (Kozinski, C.J, 
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